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from mind to matter, it is certain that he would not defend himself successfully. The materialist takes his stand on sensuous perception and posits as substantial, certain metaphysical entities such as matter, force, and the like, naively supposing that they are realities cognized by him through his senses. The idealist takes his stand on self-consciousness, and from the universal and necessary principles found there he constructs his science. The skeptic, if he employ a procedure at all, must assume logical principles borrowed from the materialist or from the idealist. If he stands on the antinomy of the two systems like Kant, he will like Kant furnish a basis for the strict conclusions of a Fichte quoted above. To say there is no bridge from mind to matter is to deny the possibility of knowing that there is such a thing as matter, for the assertion sets out from mind.

The utilitarian will be most astonished when he examines the manifold applications that the German scientific explorers have made with this idealistic method of ascertaining the mental equivalent of cognitions. In fixing with absolute precision the exact content of the various writings of Aristotle, in settling the numerous ethnological questions that arise in connection with philological researches in the higher sciences, social, political, and theological, they have the mastery of a method that gives them the vantage ground; they can solve the antinomies by pure thought; those who cannot, must work out the solutions with expenditure of life itself. Thought alone makes life valuable, and has power to protect and preserve it.

IDEALISM AND REALISM IN THEIR RELATION TO THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

From Herman Lotze's "*Mikrokosmos*."

By MAX. EBERHARDT.

Philosophy is a mother who is served with ingratitude at the hands of her children. At one time she was all in all to them; Mathematics and Astronomy, Physics and Physiology, no less than Ethics and Politics, sprang into existence

from her maternal fold. But soon her daughters had established their own affluent homes, and each one the sooner in proportion to the rapid progress made under her maternal influences, conscious of what she now had wrought by dint of her own labor, they withdrew from the control of Philosophy, who, not being able to follow them into the minutiae of their new departments of life, became troublesome by her monotonous recurrence to impertinent counsels. And thus, after all of her offspring had branched off from the common stock, Philosophy shared the dubious lot of retaining the insoluble part of all problems as her undisputed province. Placed upon this reserve, she has still maintained her vitality, ever pondering over the old hidden enigmas, and ever sought in lonely quietude by those who founded their hopes upon the unity of human knowledge.

The connection of phenomena had been thoroughly investigated by the empirical sciences; they showed how many and how multiform the links are that form the series of actions uniting a cause with its ultimate effect; but what it is which connects two coëxistent links of the series, eluded their grasp; they neither said what the things were in themselves, nor in what that interaction of things consisted by means of which the state of one might produce a change in the state of the other. The religious and moral life of man, as regards itself, has developed the belief in that which is of absolute value, in what should be, as enjoined by an imperative duty, and which, if Reality is to have any meaning whatever, must be the most real of all; but the world of forms and facts, wherein alone it would realize itself, lay before it, a strange domain, being neither a creation of its own, nor even, as it seemed, reconcilable with it. This state of things prompted the agitation of the two questions again and again as to the peculiar nature of Being, whose appearance to us we observe, and as to the relation which this world of existing reality sustains to the world of values that should be. And, ere the first two were answered, arose the third, as to the capacity for truth possessed by our cognition in general; and as to its relation, there, to the existing reality—here, to that which ought to be in it and through it.

Certitude in our thoughts is attainable by reducing them

to the certainty of others previously demonstrated, or to the evidence of immediate or intuitive truths, neither in need of, nor susceptible of, demonstration.

The confidence we have, partly in the laws of Thought which effect that reduction or generalization, partly in the simple and direct cognitions to which these laws lead us, may be saved from prejudices whose power of persuasion is but fortuitous, by repeatedly and closely examining the object of our research; whilst it could no longer be preserved by any sort of demonstration from a doubt which would turn into a possible error, and shake our confidence even in that which we always find to be a necessity of thought. A skepticism, however, that did not show the error of certain prejudices from particular contradictions liable to be pointed out, and the possibility of correcting them, but were only desirous of repeating, without provocation, the idle question, whether all things, in the end, might not be entirely different from the manner in which we of necessity must think them, would, together with Certitude, destroy all the value which we attach to reality. That this, however, shall not be—that the world cannot be an incongruity without meaning—this conviction of a moral faith is the last ground upon which we base our trust in the capacity for truth possessed by our cognition, and in the possibility of any knowledge whatever. But the extent of knowledge is not determined, as yet, by this conviction.

Only of our own being have we any immediate consciousness; in regard to an external world, all our knowledge is based upon representations which are but changeful states of our own selves. What certainty have we, then, that this image of an external world is not a dream evolved by our nature? The cautious man asks this, while the imprudent one asserts it; he forgets that it must, indeed, be so in both cases, whether things be external to us or not; even an actual world outside of us could be represented by us only in images composed of affections of our being. The subjective nature of our presentative faculty does not, therefore, decide upon the existence or non-existence of the world that it believes to be representing to itself. The attempt, however, to conceive the world's image simply as the native product of

the mind was generally early repudiated by the even tenor of science; it was always found essential, to this end, to assume within us just as many impulses foreign to the nature of our mind, and not deducible from it, as the ordinary view imagined us to receive from without. Reserving for future discussion what is of importance in these contemplations, we follow for the present the conviction to which Philosophy has ever returned, that our representative faculty springs from the reciprocation with a world independent of us.

If this be the case, however, could the act of representation be more than the effect of things—could it be their corresponding copy? and could truth, for the recognition of which we possess a capacity, consist in the agreement of Thought with Being? We speak of the image of an object when any combination of other agencies produces the same impression upon our perception which the object itself would have caused; from the similitude of its effects upon us, therefore, do we recognize one thing to be the image of another. Can this very effect, which both produce within us, ever be identical with them in such a degree, that in the observing gaze of a stranger our cognitions would be accepted as an image of the object? Wherever there is reciprocation—and cognition is but the particular instance of such an effect between the objects and the percipient mind—there the nature of the one element never turns into the other, remaining identical with itself and unchanged; but every first element serves only as an encouragement for every second one to realize from among the many states of which its own nature is susceptible, a certain particular one—that one, namely, which, according to a general law of this nature, is an adequate response to the quality and quantity of the stimulus to which it was subjected. Hence, there is a correspondence between the external causes acting upon us, and certain images within us, which *we* produce, a correspondence between a change of those causes and a variation of these, our internal or mental states. But no particular representation is a likeness of the cause whose product it is, and even the relations between these unknown elements which we imagine we recognize, are not, in the first place, the very relations existing between them abstractly; they are the forms in which we perceive

them. And this state we do not consider a human imperfection; we rather conceive it as inherent in the nature of every knowledge depending upon reciprocation with its object. All beings who are subject to this condition suffer the like consequence; they never behold things, as they are in themselves, when no one sees them, but only as they appear when they are seen.

Limited in this manner to phenomena, knowledge is still not devoid of all relation to the Existent itself. For we must not complain of its delusiveness as though a mere semblance were presented, while the essence which gives birth to this semblance were beyond our ken, absolutely avoiding all comparison with the former, and questionable even in its very existence. We cannot consider the fundamental forms of cognition as mere forms of human perception, into which the objects, in themselves entirely differently constituted, drop, without admitting that, in order to drop into these forms, the objects must, of course, conform to them in the same manner as anything must fit the mesh of the net by which it is to be caught. Or, not using any figure of speech, every phenomenon, in order to appear at all, presupposes an essential being whose internal relations furnish the principles determining the form of its appearance. From an analysis of the forms of our intuition in which perception directly seizes its objects, the conviction may be secured that these forms with which we are so familiar are not applicable to the objects themselves; but still we must seek in the nature of things and their true mutual relations the conditions which permit us to perceive them in those forms. It may thus be doubtful whether space and time, as such, may not consist in the act of representation merely, which comprehends the multifarious; but it cannot be doubtful that then the Existent need not be subject of itself to an order devoid of time and space, which, while acting upon us, is converted into the forms of coördination and sequence. The sensation which presents any object to us, or calls forth any act, is certainly not identical with its cause; but it is equally certain that we consider two objects or acts as identical, alike, or different, if their impressions upon us be identical, alike, or different; and the degrees of their affinity we estimate according as the differ-

ences are greater or less in their impressions. We thus inevitably conceive that which apparently exists and transpires, presented by perception simply in the form of the Phenomenal, as being in perfect correspondence with that which truly exists in the things themselves or transpires between them, and which, for that reason, is by no means devoid of truth and a due conformity to Law: To renounce these premises would not add to our certitude, but would simply produce a fruitless, self-contradictory affliction of thought.

Although Semblance thus points to Being, yet it points to mere formal relations of the Existent and their changes; the essence of things which subsist and move in these relations remains inscrutable. And for the very reason that the nature of things remains unknown, the actions taking place among them cannot be comprehended from their nature; only the semblance, the result of experience can teach us to surmise what in truth is taking place. In this manner philosophical research follows the same course which, as we have seen, the natural sciences have taken; it commences with the separate phenomena, mysterious and contradictory, presented by experience, and guided by the general laws of Thought, it endeavors to arrive at the form of what in truth exists and transpires, which must serve as its efficient cause to explain what is strange and contradictory in the material furnished by our perceptions. There may be many a glorious success even within this limited scope of its problem attending this spirit of Realism, which is content in reducing given data of Semblance to data of Being which we must of necessity assume; not only that it may succeed in elucidating the causal nexus in a certain analogous series of phenomena, but the comparison of the knowledge obtained may also afford a prospective glance at that which, as the true Reality, lies at the foundation of the whole phenomenal world. Yet even this final result will not, in the main, remove the character of a mere matter of fact by virtue of this principle, and thus it will ever give rise to the opposition of that idealistic disposition of the human soul which does not recognize true Being in facts that exist merely because they exist, or must of necessity be assumed because something else exists, but gives countenance to such a fact only as the

form of true Being, which, through the dignity of Thought that it represents, proves its mission, its right, its potency, to place itself at the summit of Reality as the ultimate datum, as the highest formative principle.

With the bold assertion that Thought and Being are identical, Idealism confronts the profession of Realism that the nature of things is unknowable. Although Idealism has sometimes ventured to assert this, it does not necessarily follow that it will ever be possible for human cognition to penetrate by the activity of thought the quiddity of all things and to reproduce them in thoughts; the limits which the finitude of our nature imposes upon this extension of our actual insight into the essence of things are too obvious. But, to a power of cognition free from these limits, things would no longer be impenetrable; they would not be as much beyond all comprehension as, for instance, light is beyond the faculty of hearing, sound beyond the faculty of sight; as actualized thoughts rather would they be recognized by the cognitive faculty of man, the latter recognizing itself in them. Thus, though not exactly taken as an assertion with regard to the relation of our knowledge to its object, but rather as a conviction with reference to the nature of being-in-itself, this proposition imperceptibly imparts a different meaning to Being, or the nature of things, from that given to it by current opinion. For, that content by which one thing is distinguished from another, the natural consciousness believes to have within its immediate reach, partly in sensation, partly in representations which primarily attach to sensations and embrace their elements. The more mysterious does it seem, that this content has the virtue of presenting itself to the mind as something existent, self-subsistent, tangible, in general, as a thing; whoever would discover the hidden source of extension, fulness, hardness, elasticity, or whatever pertains to objectivity, would, as man would naturally suppose, have found the true peculiar nature of the thing,—not that by which one is distinguished from the other, but that in which they all are alike, the nature of their being, the Reality. Can, then, Idealism claim the ability to solve this problem? Certainly to no greater extent than that to which Realism has also professed to solve it; what it is that causes things

to be, and why it is that they are *related* to one another; how it is finally brought about that something follows from these relations; in what manner an event, a state of becoming and acting, are possible: all this remains as impenetrable a mystery to Idealism as it does to its opponent. Admitting, for a moment, everything we may concede, although this theory may not know how all this is brought about, it may still succeed in proving a connection, according to which, supposing this very Being to exist in a manner inconceivable, there must also be, in a manner alike inconceivable, that very state of becoming and acting, and no other; even then, however, Idealism would have fathomed but the *meaning* and the rational connection of particular determinations, which we before comprehended as a totality under the name of Being; wholly unknown would it be still how this inner connection of reality can be. And this it was that the proposition, presented in a bold and striking manner, promised to fulfil when it declared Being identical with Thought; we were led to imagine that the very element through which Being as Being was first distinguished, in a manner precluding all agreement, from Thinking or the state of being thought, might finally represent itself to be an imperceptible difference, and this Being be wholly dissolved in thoughts. Now it appears that Idealism, too, in regard to the two ideas by dint of whose fusion we think the Existent, that of the What and that of its Being, leaves this very Being equally unexplained.

But, however injudicious it was to speak in that proposition of Being, it was just as inexpedient, on the other hand, to mention Thought as that which is to be identical with it; as long, at least, as this name is to distinguish with a fixed meaning a particular act of the mind from others. And this seems to be the meaning; for to sensuous perception Idealism also does not concede that it seizes the truth of things; it abandons both, and reserves to Thought, as a higher and peculiar activity, the privilege of detecting, behind the deceptive wrappings in which the world of perception crowds upon us, the true Being. But this hope is based upon a widely diffused error. That for which language has coined a name, we are generally very prone to consider a product of Thought, although its aid in determining the subject that a name serves

to denote is often very insignificant, and frequently wholly valueless. As far as sensuous impressions are concerned, we are, of course, readily convinced that no art applied in logical operations can supply to the blind or deaf the want of perception with regard to color or sound: that, therefore, blue and sweet are no conceptions thought by us, but impressions we experience, that their names are but signs of speech which remind us of a content, in which thought shares at most but to the extent that it points out its dependent character by virtue of the adjective form it imparts to it. But in the more general conceptions which are everywhere entwined with our perceptions, investing them with form and import in the ideas of Being, of Becoming, of Activity, and of any relation pointing from one element to another, we believe the more positively that we find true products of Thought, and of that alone. And still the import of Being is not capable, by the activity of Thought, of being rendered intelligible to him who does not intuitively know what is meant thereby; only by way of analysis can Thought, in removing all irrelevant conceptions which are not intended, teach us how to trace the meaning of the word that is apprehended only by direct intuition. Nobody will discover a definition with regard to Becoming which does not embrace under another name its most essential characteristics—the conception of a transition from one event to another, or of the act of transpiring in general.

Thought can aid in defining this conception only by elucidating both the points between which that mysterious transition takes place, between those which are namable only, but not capable of being further analyzed in thought. And equally beyond the reach of all logical operations is the concept of Activity. We can easily believe that we may yet reduce it to the more abstract one of the Conditioning, although it then would be questionable whether the reverse would not be more correct; but would it then be possible to determine by a further analysis of thought what the idea of the Conditioning actually signifies? Apparently, perhaps—in reality, certainly not—under this or that name Thought will after all be but capable of merely designating the ideas of an essential connection of different events, without, however, being able to generate it by dint of its own activity.

And here the objection may be urged that I unnecessarily dwell upon that which is self-evident; it may be said that Thought as a relative and synthetic activity would, of course, be compelled to presuppose the elements to be put in relation and synthesis, as having been furnished from some other source. I really aim at nothing else than to render this conviction very apparent for the moment, and to deduce its consequences. For, after some consideration, we are soon convinced that those elements secured by Thought in this manner, as having originated elsewhere, contain nothing else than the sum total of those cognitions of true Being and Eventuation which formerly were predicated of it as its inherent properties. In all cases, Thought is but an introactive agency that places the primitive intuitions of the internal and external perceptions in reciprocal relations, these being predetermined by fundamental ideas and laws the origin of which we cannot trace; logical forms proper, peculiar to itself, it develops only in the attempt at applying this truth which we find within us, to the diverse variety of perceptions, and the consequences drawn from them. Hence, there is nothing less justifiable than the assertion that Thought, as it is, is identical with Being, and capable of absorbing it without any residue; in all instances there rather remain unabsorbed, in its ideal flow, the particular traces which mark the special features of the great Entity we have distinguished by the name of Being. With more truth we should have said: Being perceives itself; we—inasmuch as we are—know, feel, perceive, or experience rightly that which is said to be; being active, we know full well what we mean, though without the power of expressing it, when not only speaking of a periodicity of phenomena but of a state in which the one is conditioned by the other. And, in this sense, all the world has always known what Being or Reality denotes, for every one has inwardly experienced the meaning of these words; having, however, found it difficult or impossible to express, by dint of logical categories, what he has so vividly experienced. Philosophy has been equally unsuccessful in supplying this deficiency; it has invariably given us only names for the experiences of life; and living and moving in names, it sometimes has experienced less vividly that which has presented itself

as the object of its efforts. Consequent upon such considerations it will in the spirit of Idealism be insisted upon, that this point should now at length be dropped; it is admitted, that we do not know how things can exist and act, but their essence does not consist in their actuality, but rather in *what* they are and act. Is, then, this content of things more susceptible of thought than the manner in which we have sought to determine it? Whatever Thought may be, it is an activity of the mind; and if it be not this, it is at all events a variable series of states which the mind experiences. Now, how can a succession of states depict and reproduce anything else than their like again?—can it apprehend the essence which is subject to these states? It will only then be possible when we add another to our former assumptions, and no longer consider what things *are*, but what they *experience*, as their very essence and their true being which Philosophy is in quest of. Thus Idealism, by a course whose particular stages we cannot here point out, would admit that it, at all events, neither knew how things were, nor what they were; but certainly what they *signify*. And this, their true being, is also knowable. What everything is in itself, that very nature of it by which it *is* at all, and is enabled to vindicate itself effectually and to be something different from others, this may forever remain an impenetrable mystery to Thought. But in the forms of their destinies, their changes, their evolution, their activity, and their participation in the grand, connecting scheme of Reality,—in all these respects things are, it is said, apprehensible by Thought, and comparable with one another; the essential import of every one of them, so far as it consists in this, is of itself exhaustible in thought, no matter whether we human beings can find this thought or not. Thus Idealism, like Realism, is confined to a cognition of that which transpires in and between things remaining unknown; but in the import which this fact presents, it imagines that it possesses all essential truth; things do but exist for the purpose of realizing this fact.

A similar conviction has always been entertained and expressed in other forms by Faith, inasmuch as it has held the world to be of divine creation. It thereby denies as emphatically as philosophical Idealism that there is resident in things

any being, or part of their being, which they are invested with by means of themselves. All they are, they are by the will and intent of God; their most peculiar being consists in that which God has meant or intended with them, in their significance as to the unity of the great scheme of Life. To fathom this scheme is not what Faith claims, but its idea of God is full of different rays beaming upon one another, as it were, which cast their illumining lights also upon the world created below. The idea of an immutable and just God harmonizes with the rigorous laws of the phenomenal world; the infinite fulness of His beatific Being conforms to the beauty of the latter—His sanctity with the order of events in the world of morality. To trace back to these creative attributes of God all particular incidents of Reality, was neither attempted, nor was it considered possible; it was sufficient to believe, despite the contradiction of numerous perceptions, in the verity of these attributes in general, and to derive anew in particular instances, from a selection of preferred phenomena, the vivid feeling of their efficiency prevailing throughout the universe.

In two respects philosophical Idealism sought to transcend this belief. It first took exception to the loose manner in which Religion spoke of a personal God, in which it permitted Him to evoke things from naught into reality, and to place Himself in a state of reciprocation with these realized nullities; the metaphysical import of all these proceedings was to be discovered and raised into the light of comprehension.

None of these efforts, upon the purport of which the conclusion of our considerations invites us to enter more fully, have been successful; whilst criticising all ideas which Faith had anthropomorphosed of the relation of God to the world, they have left remaining in forms of speech generally artificially obscured, as a final outcoming, the assertion merely, that a single highest Idea permeates all phenomena of the actual world with its formative and authoritative principles, without explaining how. And for the very reason that Idealism could at most but seize upon the import of the world and not furnish the proof of its reality, everything that pointed to this enigma was eliminated from its consideration. There was no longer any mention of God, for this name sig-

nifies naught without the predicates of actual power and efficiency; there could only be mention of the Idea whose content, whether in this or that manner alike incomprehensible, actually constituted the very being and import of the world. But for that very reason the hope was entertained of being able to express fully and systematically the whole tenor of this Idea in thoughts, and by this second effort greatly to surpass Faith, which knew but in general terms the intent of God—this remaining, in its particulars, inscrutable. This promise, likewise, could be realized only by abstracting from the nature of the subject what remained inconceivable to Thought. For, as a matter of course, the living forces which Faith had contemplated as resident in God, presented themselves to Thought in a manner just as inconceivable as the sensuous impressions furnished by perception. For them, too, we invent names; their content we merely experience, and do not seize by means of Thought. What is good or bad remains just as inconceivable as what is blue or sweet; only after an immediate feeling has taught us the presence of merit and demerit in the world, and the difficulty of distinguishing them, Thought may develop from out of that which we thus experience, certain criteria which afterwards assist us in subordinating anything particular in the one or the other of those two general intuitions. Is it possible to find in concepts the peculiar vivifying nerve of Justice? We may talk much of a balance of powers, of a conformity among active and passive states, of weal or woe falling back upon him who has caused them; but what process of Thought explains the interest we exhibit in these phenomena only when they signify that which we call a Retribution? Love and hatred, are they thinkable? can their quiddity be exhausted in concepts? In whatever process of transforming duality into unity, or in whatever mode of separating what might be one, we should be desirous of perceiving their significance: we shall forever announce but an enigma. For the enigma is the pointing out of criteria, from which the full, living content to which they belong does not spontaneously flow, but must be devined, as it does not lie in them. Now, this whole, living content which Faith apprehended in the personal being of God, Philosophy not

only expected to reproduce in Thought; it imagined that it conferred upon Him, who is more than all that may be called Idea, an honorable distinction by raising Him from the obscurity of that which is experienced and felt with all the energies of heart and soul to the dignity of a concept as an object of pure Thought.

Nature and Humanity are alike subject to this treatment, which reduces the true import of all things and events to the formal manner of their appearance, and which looks upon things and events themselves merely as being designed for the realization of these forms. The creatures of nature exist, according to this view, in order to take rank in a system of classification, and to secure to the logical categories of the General, Particular, and Individual, an abundance of phenomena; their living actions and their reciprocation take place in order to celebrate the mysteries of the Differential, the Opposite, of Polarity, and Unity,—to perform a rhythm in whose oscillations Affirmation, Negation, and mutual Limitation, succeed one another. Man, engaged in the contemplation of the Spiritual world, would at one time, under the influence of Realism, view Thought and all spiritual life simply as the highest forms in which those mysterious powers, Affirmation, Negation, Contrariety and its extinction, would become manifest; and at another time, more given to Idealism, he would consider Thought to be the true being and object of all things, looking upon those forms wherein that which merely exists and transpires is presented to him as the faint prelude to the more potent theme of thought. But he went not beyond the attempt at recognizing Thought as the most essential attribute of mind—as the acme of Thought, the thinking of Thought, the pure self-reflection of the logical activity of the mind. Existence and the dignity of the moral world were, of course, not forgotten; but the Imperative in the moral nature of man had also to submit to this procedure by which everything was reduced to formal relations; it seemed as if it ought to be only to the extent it repeated, in the forms of its realization, those esteemed relations which stood for the true nature of Being.

Right here, in pointing out these errors, we drop this subject. Tacitly passing by much that is considered great and

momentous by the disciples of this school, this brief sketch shows a spirit of partiality in merely pointing out what was apt to serve as an introduction to the object we had in view in these disquisitions. Philosophy is at present neither exclusively controlled by the false Idealism we have been last opposing, nor is it possible to avoid the mistake into which it has fallen; but we do not deem it proper as yet to set forth the conviction we desire to hold as our ultimatum. Only, as a preliminary enunciation we may say: The Essential of things does not consist in thoughts, and Thought is not capable of apprehending it; but the whole Mind may nevertheless experience, in other forms of its activity and its affections, the necessary import of all Being and activity, and then Thought serves as a means of placing what was experienced in that connection which its nature requires, and in experiencing it more intensely as the mind succeeds in controlling that connection. Very old errors they are which oppose this insight.

It was long before the vivid imagination of man recognized in Thought the rein which secures to its course steadiness, certainty, and truth; it may take just as long before it will be known that the rein cannot generate the motion it is to control. The shadow of Antiquity, its mischievous over-estimation of the *Logos*, hangs still over us, and does not permit us to perceive either in the Real or the Ideal that by dint of which both are more than all Reason.

THE TRINITY AND THE DOUBLE PROCESSION.

By FRANCIS A. HENRY.

If it be admitted that truths concerning what we call the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Divine, supply a key to the comprehension of this mysterious universe in which, we know not how, we find ourselves, supply an explanation of this life which each of us is somehow living without memory of its beginning or foresight of its end, then it follows that the science which treats of these truths has a right to its old name of *scientia scientiarum*, and may fairly be considered the